Version 2 Added config file and IPV6 support and benchmarks with massive performance uplifts.

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pj1234678
2026-09-24 15:25:57 -07:00
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parent 4ec95e9f84
commit 589351f6da
38 changed files with 19067 additions and 26 deletions
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//! DHCP security gates + filter/framing compositions, part 5.
//!
//! Covers security-relevant behavior NOT locked by `test_security.rs`,
//! `test_security_extra.rs`, `test_security_edge.rs`, `test_security_wire.rs`
//! or the RFC suites — mostly *compositions* of individually-tested quirks:
//!
//! - PRL filtering (not just the 300 cap) strips the NAK Message text live
//! - an RFC-valid PAD byte before END truncates the option list (desync via
//! spec-compliant bytes, unlike the malformed-option tests)
//! - zero-length option matrix: which empty options decode vs reject,
//! including the Router/DNS-empty quirk
//! - empty Router/DNS encode to `[3,0]`/`[6,0]` on the wire but decode-drop,
//! while empty PRL survives (asymmetry)
//! - garbage-datagram battery (empty/1-byte/short/bad-cookie) keeps the
//! server alive for the next valid Discover
//! - kernel-style truncation of an oversized datagram decodes without panic
//! - Request with a *wrong* (not just missing) Server ID is still honored
//! - Decline from an unknown chaddr is a silent no-op with no reply
//! - broadcast-flagged Release still frees when the gate passes
//!
//! `*_quirk` tests lock currently-unsafe behavior for review, not approval.
use dhcp4r::options::*;
use dhcp4r::packet::*;
use dhcp4r::server;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, UdpSocket};
use std::ops::Add;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// helpers (same patterns as test_security_wire.rs)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn unwrap_packet(r: Result<Packet, CustomErr<&[u8]>>) -> Packet {
match r {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(_) => panic!("expected Ok Packet"),
}
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
fn make_raw(
op: u8,
hlen: u8,
hops: u8,
xid: u32,
secs: u16,
flags: [u8; 2],
ci: [u8; 4],
yi: [u8; 4],
si: [u8; 4],
gi: [u8; 4],
chaddr: [u8; 6],
opts_after_cookie: Vec<u8>,
) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut v = vec![0u8; 236];
v[0] = op;
v[1] = 1;
v[2] = hlen;
v[3] = hops;
v[4..8].copy_from_slice(&xid.to_be_bytes());
v[8..10].copy_from_slice(&secs.to_be_bytes());
v[10] = flags[0];
v[11] = flags[1];
v[12..16].copy_from_slice(&ci);
v[16..20].copy_from_slice(&yi);
v[20..24].copy_from_slice(&si);
v[24..28].copy_from_slice(&gi);
v[28..34].copy_from_slice(&chaddr);
v.extend_from_slice(&[99, 130, 83, 99]);
v.extend_from_slice(&opts_after_cookie);
v
}
// Replica of examples/server.rs lease state (bodies identical; only the
// methods needed here are included).
const IP_START: [u8; 4] = [192, 168, 2, 2];
const IP_START_NUM: u32 = u32::from_be_bytes(IP_START);
const LEASE_NUM: u32 = 252;
const LEASE_DURATION_SECS: u32 = 86400;
// Example-like handler: Discover->Offer, Request->Ack, Release|Decline gated,
// everything else ignored. Mirrors examples/server.rs match arms.
struct ExampleLike {
leases: HashMap<Ipv4Addr, ([u8; 6], Option<Instant>)>,
last_lease: u32,
lease_duration: Duration,
#[allow(dead_code)]
server_ip: Ipv4Addr,
}
impl ExampleLike {
fn new(server_ip: Ipv4Addr) -> Self {
Self {
leases: HashMap::new(),
last_lease: 0,
lease_duration: Duration::new(LEASE_DURATION_SECS as u64, 0),
server_ip,
}
}
fn available(&self, chaddr: &[u8; 6], addr: &Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
let pos: u32 = (*addr).into();
pos >= IP_START_NUM
&& pos < IP_START_NUM + LEASE_NUM
&& match self.leases.get(addr) {
Some((mac, expiry)) => {
*mac == *chaddr || expiry.map_or(true, |exp| Instant::now().gt(&exp))
}
None => true,
}
}
fn current_lease(&self, chaddr: &[u8; 6]) -> Option<Ipv4Addr> {
for (i, v) in &self.leases {
if v.0 == *chaddr {
return Some(*i);
}
}
None
}
}
impl server::Handler for ExampleLike {
fn handle_request(&mut self, server: &server::Server, in_packet: Packet) {
match in_packet.message_type() {
Ok(MessageType::Discover) => {
if let Some(ip) = self.current_lease(&in_packet.chaddr) {
let _ = server.reply(
MessageType::Offer,
vec![DhcpOption::IpAddressLeaseTime(LEASE_DURATION_SECS)],
ip,
in_packet,
);
return;
}
for _ in 0..LEASE_NUM {
self.last_lease = (self.last_lease + 1) % LEASE_NUM;
let cand: Ipv4Addr = (IP_START_NUM + self.last_lease).into();
if self.available(&in_packet.chaddr, &cand) {
let _ = server.reply(
MessageType::Offer,
vec![DhcpOption::IpAddressLeaseTime(LEASE_DURATION_SECS)],
cand,
in_packet,
);
break;
}
}
}
Ok(MessageType::Request) => {
// NOTE: mirrors the example — the for_this_server gate is
// commented out upstream, so Requests are honored regardless.
let req_ip = match in_packet.option(REQUESTED_IP_ADDRESS) {
Some(DhcpOption::RequestedIpAddress(x)) => *x,
_ => in_packet.ciaddr,
};
if let Some(ip) = self.current_lease(&in_packet.chaddr) {
let _ = server.reply(
MessageType::Ack,
vec![DhcpOption::IpAddressLeaseTime(LEASE_DURATION_SECS)],
ip,
in_packet,
);
return;
}
if !self.available(&in_packet.chaddr, &req_ip) {
let _ = server.reply(
MessageType::Nak,
vec![DhcpOption::Message("Requested IP not available".to_string())],
Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
in_packet,
);
return;
}
self.leases.insert(
req_ip,
(
in_packet.chaddr,
Some(Instant::now().add(self.lease_duration)),
),
);
let _ = server.reply(
MessageType::Ack,
vec![DhcpOption::IpAddressLeaseTime(LEASE_DURATION_SECS)],
req_ip,
in_packet,
);
}
Ok(MessageType::Release) | Ok(MessageType::Decline) => {
if !server.for_this_server(&in_packet) {
return;
}
if let Some(ip) = self.current_lease(&in_packet.chaddr) {
self.leases.remove(&ip);
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
}
fn serve_example_like() -> (std::net::SocketAddr, Ipv4Addr) {
let srv_sock = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
let srv_addr = srv_sock.local_addr().unwrap();
let server_ip = Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 2, 1);
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _ = server::Server::serve(
srv_sock,
server_ip,
Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 2, 255),
ExampleLike::new(server_ip),
);
});
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100));
(srv_addr, server_ip)
}
fn send_recv(
client: &UdpSocket,
srv_addr: &std::net::SocketAddr,
p: &Packet,
buf: &mut [u8; 1500],
rbuf: &mut [u8; 1500],
) -> Packet {
client.send_to(&p.encode(buf).to_vec(), srv_addr).unwrap();
let (n, _) = client.recv_from(rbuf).expect("expected reply");
unwrap_packet(Packet::from(&rbuf[..n]))
}
// ===========================================================================
// A. PRL filtering (not size) strips the NAK text; RFC-valid PAD desyncs
// ===========================================================================
/// The NAK Message is dropped by *PRL filtering* here, not just the 300 cap:
/// unit-level, `[53,54,56]` filtered by req `[1]` keeps `[53,54]` although
/// the 7-byte packet would easily fit. Live, a victim Request carrying
/// PRL=`[1]` gets a textless NAK. Locked (both mechanisms coincide live).
#[test]
fn sec4_nak_message_dropped_by_prl_filter_not_size() {
// unit: short text fits size-wise, filter drops it anyway
let mut opts = vec![
DhcpOption::DhcpMessageType(MessageType::Nak),
DhcpOption::ServerIdentifier(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 2, 1)),
DhcpOption::Message("no".to_string()),
];
server::filter_options_by_req(&mut opts, &[1]);
assert_eq!(
opts.iter().map(|o| o.code()).collect::<Vec<u8>>(),
vec![53, 54],
"PRL [1] drops Message even though it fits"
);
// live: occupier takes .50, victim asks with PRL=[1] -> textless NAK
let (srv_addr, server_ip) = serve_example_like();
let client = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
client
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(2)))
.unwrap();
let mut buf = [0u8; 1500];
let mut rbuf = [0u8; 1500];
let occupier = Packet {
reply: false, hops: 0, xid: 0xA001, secs: 0, broadcast: false,
ciaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, yiaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
siaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, giaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
chaddr: [0xA0; 6],
options: vec![
DhcpOption::DhcpMessageType(MessageType::Request),
DhcpOption::ServerIdentifier(server_ip),
DhcpOption::RequestedIpAddress(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 2, 50)),
],
};
assert_eq!(
send_recv(&client, &srv_addr, &occupier, &mut buf, &mut rbuf).message_type(),
Ok(MessageType::Ack)
);
let req = Packet {
reply: false, hops: 0, xid: 0xA002, secs: 0, broadcast: false,
ciaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, yiaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
siaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, giaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
chaddr: [0xA1; 6],
options: vec![
DhcpOption::DhcpMessageType(MessageType::Request),
DhcpOption::ServerIdentifier(server_ip),
DhcpOption::RequestedIpAddress(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 2, 50)),
DhcpOption::ParameterRequestList(vec![1]),
],
};
let rep = send_recv(&client, &srv_addr, &req, &mut buf, &mut rbuf);
assert_eq!(rep.message_type(), Ok(MessageType::Nak));
assert!(rep.option(MESSAGE).is_none(), "PRL filter strips NAK text");
assert_eq!(
rep.option(SERVER_IDENTIFIER),
Some(&DhcpOption::ServerIdentifier(server_ip))
);
}
/// RFC 2132 says receivers MUST handle PAD octets, but here a single
/// spec-compliant `0x00` before END truncates the option list exactly like a
/// malformed option: Server ID after the PAD is stripped, leading Discover
/// survives. Desync with fully valid bytes — locked.
#[test]
fn sec4_rfc_pad_byte_before_end_truncates_list() {
let raw = make_raw(
1, 6, 0, 0xA010, 0, [0, 0],
[0, 0, 0, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0],
[0xA2; 6],
vec![53, 1, 1, 0, 54, 4, 10, 20, 30, 40, 255],
);
let p = unwrap_packet(Packet::from(&raw));
assert_eq!(p.options.len(), 1, "PAD truncates like a bad option");
assert_eq!(p.message_type(), Ok(MessageType::Discover));
assert!(p.option(SERVER_IDENTIFIER).is_none(), "Server ID stripped");
}
// ===========================================================================
// B. Zero-length option matrix (decode edges per code)
// ===========================================================================
/// Zero-length options split by kind: variable-length/text codes accept
/// empty (`55`/`12`/`56`/unrecognized incl. PAD-as-TLV `0`), while every
/// fixed-size code rejects — including Router/DNS, which fail even empty
/// (same `custom_many0` quirk as populated ones). Exact errors locked.
#[test]
fn sec4_zero_length_option_matrix() {
// accepted as empty
match decode_option(&[55, 0]) {
Ok((_, DhcpOption::ParameterRequestList(v))) => assert!(v.is_empty()),
_ => panic!("[55,0] must decode to empty PRL"),
}
match decode_option(&[12, 0]) {
Ok((_, DhcpOption::HostName(s))) => assert_eq!(s, ""),
_ => panic!("[12,0] must decode to empty HostName"),
}
match decode_option(&[56, 0]) {
Ok((_, DhcpOption::Message(s))) => assert_eq!(s, ""),
_ => panic!("[56,0] must decode to empty Message"),
}
match decode_option(&[99, 0]) {
Ok((_, DhcpOption::Unrecognized(r))) => {
assert_eq!(r.code, 99);
assert!(r.data.is_empty());
}
_ => panic!("[99,0] must decode to empty Unrecognized"),
}
match decode_option(&[0, 0]) {
Ok((_, DhcpOption::Unrecognized(r))) => {
assert_eq!(r.code, 0);
assert!(r.data.is_empty());
}
_ => panic!("[0,0] must decode to empty Unrecognized"),
}
// rejected: fixed-size codes need payload bytes
for wire in [
vec![53, 0], // message type needs 1 byte
vec![54, 0], // server id needs 4
vec![50, 0], // requested ip needs 4
vec![1, 0], // subnet mask needs 4
vec![51, 0], // lease time needs 4
] {
assert!(
matches!(decode_option(&wire), Err(CustomErr::InvalidHlen)),
"{:?} must be InvalidHlen",
wire
);
}
// rejected quirk: Router/DNS fail even with empty data
for wire in [vec![3, 0], vec![6, 0]] {
assert!(
matches!(decode_option(&wire), Err(CustomErr::InvalidHlen)),
"{:?} must be InvalidHlen (many0 quirk)",
wire
);
}
}
/// Empty Router/DNS encode to `[3,0]`/`[6,0]` on the wire but decode-drop,
/// while empty PRL survives the round-trip — the asymmetry, end to end.
#[test]
fn sec4_empty_router_dns_dropped_empty_prl_kept() {
let p = Packet {
reply: false, hops: 0, xid: 0xA020, secs: 0, broadcast: false,
ciaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, yiaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
siaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, giaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
chaddr: [0xA3; 6],
options: vec![
DhcpOption::DhcpMessageType(MessageType::Discover),
DhcpOption::ParameterRequestList(vec![]),
DhcpOption::Router(vec![]),
DhcpOption::DomainNameServer(vec![]),
],
};
let mut buf = [0u8; 1500];
let enc = p.encode(&mut buf).to_vec();
for needle in [vec![55u8, 0], vec![3u8, 0], vec![6u8, 0]] {
assert!(
enc.windows(2).any(|w| w == needle.as_slice()),
"{:?} must be on the wire",
needle
);
}
let q = unwrap_packet(Packet::from(&enc));
assert_eq!(
q.options.iter().map(|o| o.code()).collect::<Vec<u8>>(),
vec![53, 55],
"empty Router/DNS dropped, empty PRL kept"
);
}
// ===========================================================================
// C. Garbage survival + kernel-style truncation (live + unit)
// ===========================================================================
/// Battery of garbage datagrams (empty, 1 byte, short header, bad cookie)
/// keeps the server alive: the next valid Discover still gets Offer `.3`.
/// Malformed input never kills the loop when the END-skip lands non-empty.
#[test]
fn sec4_garbage_datagram_battery_server_survives_live() {
let srv_sock = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
let srv_addr = srv_sock.local_addr().unwrap();
struct H;
impl server::Handler for H {
fn handle_request(&mut self, s: &server::Server, p: Packet) {
let _ = s.reply(
MessageType::Offer,
vec![],
Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 7, 10),
p,
);
}
}
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _ = server::Server::serve(
srv_sock,
Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 7, 1),
Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 7, 255),
H,
);
});
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100));
let client = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
client
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(2)))
.unwrap();
let mut buf = [0u8; 1500];
let mut rbuf = [0u8; 1500];
// each of these decodes to Err (no panic: tiny inputs fail before split)
client.send_to(&[], srv_addr).unwrap();
client.send_to(&[0u8], srv_addr).unwrap();
client.send_to(&[0u8; 10], srv_addr).unwrap();
client.send_to(&[0u8; 235], srv_addr).unwrap();
let mut bad_cookie = vec![0u8; 236];
bad_cookie[0] = 1;
bad_cookie[1] = 1;
bad_cookie[2] = 6;
bad_cookie.extend_from_slice(&[9, 9, 9, 9, 53, 1, 1, 255]);
client.send_to(&bad_cookie, srv_addr).unwrap();
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100));
// server still alive and answering
let disc = Packet {
reply: false, hops: 0, xid: 0xA030, secs: 0, broadcast: false,
ciaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, yiaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
siaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, giaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
chaddr: [0xA4; 6],
options: vec![DhcpOption::DhcpMessageType(MessageType::Discover)],
};
client.send_to(&disc.encode(&mut buf).to_vec(), srv_addr).unwrap();
let (n, _) = client.recv_from(&mut rbuf).expect("server survived garbage");
let rep = unwrap_packet(Packet::from(&rbuf[..n]));
assert_eq!(rep.message_type(), Ok(MessageType::Offer));
assert_eq!(rep.yiaddr, Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 7, 10));
}
/// An 1844-byte datagram sliced to 1500 (kernel-style truncation) still
/// decodes: the cut lands mid-TLV, the swallow skips one byte, options stay
/// bounded, and re-encode caps at 300 with Discover first. No panic.
#[test]
fn sec4_kernel_style_truncation_decodes_without_panic() {
let mut opts = vec![53, 1, 1];
for _ in 0..400 {
opts.extend_from_slice(&[200, 2, 7, 8]);
}
opts.push(255);
let raw = make_raw(
1, 6, 0, 0xA031, 0, [0, 0],
[0, 0, 0, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0],
[0xA5; 6], opts,
);
assert_eq!(raw.len(), 1844);
let truncated = &raw[..1500]; // what recv_into-1500 would deliver
let p = unwrap_packet(Packet::from(truncated));
assert_eq!(p.message_type(), Ok(MessageType::Discover));
assert!(p.options.len() < 402, "truncated tail lost, prefix kept");
let mut buf = [0u8; 1500];
let enc = p.encode(&mut buf).to_vec();
assert!(enc.len() <= 300, "re-encode capped");
}
// ===========================================================================
// D. Gate compositions: wrong-ID Request honored; Decline no-lease silent
// ===========================================================================
/// A Request naming a *wrong* (but well-formed) server is still Acked —
/// complements the missing-ID renew test: the gate is disabled for values
/// too, not just absence. Locked live.
#[test]
fn sec4_wrong_id_request_honored_live() {
let (srv_addr, _) = serve_example_like();
let client = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
client
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(2)))
.unwrap();
let mut buf = [0u8; 1500];
let mut rbuf = [0u8; 1500];
let req = Packet {
reply: false, hops: 0, xid: 0xA040, secs: 0, broadcast: false,
ciaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, yiaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
siaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, giaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
chaddr: [0xA6; 6],
options: vec![
DhcpOption::DhcpMessageType(MessageType::Request),
DhcpOption::ServerIdentifier(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 99, 99, 99)),
DhcpOption::RequestedIpAddress(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 2, 73)),
],
};
client.send_to(&req.encode(&mut buf).to_vec(), srv_addr).unwrap();
let (n, _) = client.recv_from(&mut rbuf).expect("Ack despite wrong ID");
let rep = unwrap_packet(Packet::from(&rbuf[..n]));
assert_eq!(rep.message_type(), Ok(MessageType::Ack));
assert_eq!(rep.yiaddr, Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 2, 73));
}
/// Decline from an unknown chaddr (no lease anywhere) is a silent no-op with
/// no reply and no state change — documents the quiet failure mode live.
#[test]
fn sec4_decline_no_lease_no_reply_live() {
let (srv_addr, server_ip) = serve_example_like();
let client = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
client
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_millis(400)))
.unwrap();
let mut buf = [0u8; 1500];
let mut rbuf = [0u8; 1500];
let dec = Packet {
reply: false, hops: 0, xid: 0xA041, secs: 0, broadcast: false,
ciaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, yiaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
siaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, giaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
chaddr: [0xA7; 6],
options: vec![
DhcpOption::DhcpMessageType(MessageType::Decline),
DhcpOption::ServerIdentifier(server_ip),
DhcpOption::RequestedIpAddress(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 2, 74)),
],
};
client.send_to(&dec.encode(&mut buf).to_vec(), srv_addr).unwrap();
assert!(
client.recv_from(&mut rbuf).is_err(),
"Decline with no lease must get no reply"
);
}
// ===========================================================================
// E. Broadcast Release still gated only on server ID, not flags
// ===========================================================================
/// A broadcast-flagged Release with the correct Server ID still frees the
/// lease — flags play no role in the gate; only the identifier matters.
/// Locked live (precondition asserts the flag survived decode).
#[test]
fn sec4_broadcast_release_still_gated_only_on_id_live() {
let (srv_addr, server_ip) = serve_example_like();
let client = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
client
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(2)))
.unwrap();
let mut buf = [0u8; 1500];
let mut rbuf = [0u8; 1500];
let victim = [0xA8; 6];
// occupy .75
let req = Packet {
reply: false, hops: 0, xid: 0xA050, secs: 0, broadcast: false,
ciaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, yiaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
siaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, giaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
chaddr: victim,
options: vec![
DhcpOption::DhcpMessageType(MessageType::Request),
DhcpOption::ServerIdentifier(server_ip),
DhcpOption::RequestedIpAddress(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 2, 75)),
],
};
client.send_to(&req.encode(&mut buf).to_vec(), srv_addr).unwrap();
let (n, _) = client.recv_from(&mut rbuf).expect("Ack");
assert_eq!(unwrap_packet(Packet::from(&rbuf[..n])).message_type(), Ok(MessageType::Ack));
// broadcast Release naming the right server: freed (flag irrelevant)
let raw = make_raw(
1, 6, 0, 0xA051, 0, [0, 128], // low-byte 0x80 -> broadcast=true
[0, 0, 0, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0],
victim,
vec![53, 1, 7, 54, 4, 192, 168, 2, 1, 255],
);
assert!(unwrap_packet(Packet::from(&raw)).broadcast, "precondition");
client.send_to(&raw, srv_addr).unwrap();
// prove freed: a stranger can now take .75
let stranger = Packet {
reply: false, hops: 0, xid: 0xA052, secs: 0, broadcast: false,
ciaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, yiaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
siaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED, giaddr: Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED,
chaddr: [0xA9; 6],
options: vec![
DhcpOption::DhcpMessageType(MessageType::Request),
DhcpOption::ServerIdentifier(server_ip),
DhcpOption::RequestedIpAddress(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 2, 75)),
],
};
client.send_to(&stranger.encode(&mut buf).to_vec(), srv_addr).unwrap();
// Release itself gets no reply; the stranger's unicast Ack proves the
// Release freed .75 regardless of the broadcast flag.
let (n, _) = client.recv_from(&mut rbuf).expect("stranger Ack");
let rep = unwrap_packet(Packet::from(&rbuf[..n]));
assert_eq!(rep.message_type(), Ok(MessageType::Ack));
assert_eq!(rep.yiaddr, Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 2, 75), "freed by broadcast Release");
}